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Rental Premiums for Share Versus Cash Leases 
The long-standing practice of share leasing for farmland, especially in Mid-Western U.S.
agriculture, is increasingly giving way to cash leasing and to combinations of cash and share leasing
(Reiss; Barry et al.; Barry).  According to the 2001 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership
Survey, cash payments instead of or in addition to crop shares characterized about 59% of farmland
leases in Illinois during 1999, up from 37% in 1988 (National Agricultural Statistics Service).  The
drivers of change primarily involve risk, income, managerial control, (especially when multiple
landowners are involved), and land value issues facing farmers, landowners, and professional farm
managers who represent the land owners (Sotomayor, Barry, and Ellinger).  These changes may
strongly influence the risk and financial positions of the respective leasing parties.  
Compared to fixed cash leases, share leases offer farmers the opportunity to allocate yield risks
and perhaps management responsibilities to land owners in the same proportion that crops and
operating costs are shared.  At the same time, however, the allocation of returns in the relationship
would need to compensate the landowner for these inputs.  The possible existence of a risk premium is
comparable to the long-standing search for risk premia in equity and commodity markets
(Kockerhapkota; Williams).  Other studies (e.g., Dasgupta, Knight and Love; Cheung; Allen and
Leuck) conclude that risk is of secondary importance in leasing arrangements relative to transactions
cost and property rights.  Little if any empirical evidence is available, however, about the potential
spread between rent levels on cash versus share leases.  The availability of such information would
assist in evaluating the equitable terms and incentive characteristics of leasing arrangements and
elucidate the risk management dimensions of share leases. 2
The goals of this study are to empirically estimate the rental spread between cash and share
leases in Illinois and to determine how these spreads are related to risks and other farm characteristics. 
A conceptual framework demonstrating the key relationships is established in the next section.  Data
from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association are used in the empirical analysis.  The
estimated spreads represent the rent paid by farmers and received by landowners, although the
available data confine the analysis to the farmer’s side of the transaction.  The article concludes by
discussing the implications of the findings.
Conceptual Framework
The theoretical basis for a farmer’s valuation of crop share versus cash leases can be
demonstrated by expressing the expected utility from leasing under each rental arrangement.  The goal
is to suggest key attributes from the farmer’s perspective that could influence the properties of the rental
spread, and thus serve as the basis for empirical testing.  The demonstration can be aided by utilizing
the mean-variance approach in which the farmer’s utility is modeled by the negative exponential
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the expectation and variance of the value of farm production – the farmer’s primary sources of risk.  In
a share lease, the variance of the farmer’s net income is reduced in proportion to the share rent, yielding
net income variance of 2
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Substituting 2) and 3) into 1), the farmer’s expected utility condition under share leasing is 
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For cash leasing, the variance of the farmer’s net returns is
Substituting 2) and 5) into 1) for cash leasing, the farmer’s expected utility is 4
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The level of cash rent that yields equal expected utility between a share lease and a cash lease is
found by setting equations 4) and 6) equal to each other and solving for r:
The observed rental spread then is the difference between the share rent and the expected utility-
equivalent cash rent (see the appendix for the derivation details and for a parallel characterization of the
landowner’s rental spread):
Inspection of 8) indicates that the rental spread may directly reflect the farmer’s level of risk
aversion, the variability of crop returns, the magnitude of the shares, and the levels of agency costs. 
From the farmer’s viewpoint, higher levels of risk aversion are associated with higher rental spreads,
and thus lower bids on cash rents relative to existing share rents.  Less risk averse farmers will offer
higher bids on cash leases relative to share leases.  Greater variability of returns on farmland is
associated with greater rental spreads, and thus lower bids on cash rents relative to existing share rents. 
Similarly, a larger positive (negative) difference between the agency costs on cash versus share leases
would increase (decrease) the rental spread.  Thus, farmers who perceive less variability in returns,
achieve lower than average anticipated variability due to other risk management practices, or who
experience higher agency costs on share leasing would bid higher cash rents relative to expected share
rents.  5
The potential magnitude of the rental spreads is illustrated in Table 1 for a range of numerical
values of the spread determinants in equation 8).  The risk aversion coefficient is bounded by the values
observed by Babcock, Choi and Feinerman for a gamble (rent per acre) size of approximately $100,
with three equally spaced intervals within the boundaries.  The landowners’ shares are the commonly
observed 1/2 and 1/3 levels in Illinois, standard deviations are $10, $20, $30, and $40 (Barry,
Escalante, and Bard), and for simplicity the agency costs on cash and share leases are assumed to be
equal.  For the1/2 share, rental spreads in the $2 to $10 range fall within the more plausible ranges of
the risk aversion and variability measures.  For this illustration, the degree of sensitivity of the rental
spreads appears greater across the risk attitude and variability ranges than for the two share levels.  To
the extent that the farmer’s agency and other costs on share leases exceed those of cash leases, the
rental spreads in Table 1 would decline.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis first determines measures of the rental spreads for Illinois grain farms and
then utilizes logit regression to test how positive and negative spreads are influenced by measures or
proxies of the variables in equation 8) and by other structural characteristics.  Farm level data from
1995 to 1998 from the Illinois FBFM Association are used in the analysis.  Revisions in 1994 to the
FBFM accounting and reporting format to emphasize the compilation and reporting of operator data
rather than whole farm data now allow direct measurement of per acre cash rents and share rents paid
by farmers to landlords.  These rental payment measurements were not identifiable prior to 1995. 
Inconsistencies over time, however, in the balance sheet certifications of individual FBFM operator
data in multiple operator farms (i.e., partnerships) require the use of single operator farms only in the6
econometric portion of the study’s analysis.  This specification reduced the number of farm
observations by about 20 per year.
The data are reported by FBFM in terms of each farm’s tillable acres and the “operator acres”,
thus reflecting whatever sharing levels (1/2 - 1/2, 2/3 - 2/3) are employed in the operator’s lease
contracts.  For example, two acres leased under a 1/2-1/2 crop share lease are equivalent to 1
operator acre.  The per acre values of farm production, including government payments and variable
costs attributed as share rent to the landlord, are determined by calculating the operator’s crop returns
and variable costs in proportion to total farm acres relative to operator acres, and dividing the
difference between these increments by the number of share leased acres.3,4 Cash rent per acre is
calculated by dividing a farm’s total cash rent paid by the number of cash rented acres.  
The calculated share rent is then compared to the farm’s average cash rent paid on cash leased
acres to determine the rental spread.  If the share and cash rents averaged $121.43 and $115 per
acres, respectively, then the rental spread would be $6.43 per acres, or 5.59% of the cash rent value
(see Footnote 4).  
The descriptive and econometric analyses employ two different measurement approaches to
determine the rental spreads.  In the descriptive portion, the rental spread is measured as the difference
between the mean share rent and the mean cash rent for all balance sheet-certified single-operator
FBFM farms for the 1995-1998 period.  These farms totaled 1,598, 1,805, 1,879, and 1,914 for
1995 to 1998, respectively.  The spread measurement approach in the regression analysis is based on
those farms that utilize both types of leases (255).  Constraining the data in this latter fashion implies a
clearer opportunity for the farmer to choose between the leasing arrangements and may reflect more7
accurately and realistically the influence of the independent variables on the rental spread.  
Further adjustments in measuring spreads in the descriptive case reflect the different
arrangements in the sharing of operating costs.  Previous surveys and studies (Bullen; Reiss; Reiss and
Koenig) indicate consistent sharing of the costs of fertilizer, pesticides, seed, and other crop expenses
between farmers and landlords in Illinois.  Inconsistencies arise, however, in the cost sharing of drying,
storing, and insuring crops.  Sharing of these costs incurs in some cases and not in others, but neither
condition is observable in the FBFM data.  Accordingly, the rental spreads are measured with and
without the sharing of these latter expenses.  
To ensure that cash rent payments are not unduly influenced by family and personal
relationships between the leasing parties, the cash rent values are constrained to exceed $10 per acre.5
Rental levels below this amount are excluded from the analysis.  Finally, the regressions are run for the
data set as a whole, and for the three classes of farms that differ materially from each other in terms of
soil productivity.  
Descriptive Results
Table 2 reports the per acre averages of cash rents, share rents, and rental spreads for the
1995 to 1998 period for each of three farm classes: 1) North and Central Illinois grain farms with high
soil ratings (86 to 100); 2) North and Central Illinois grain farms with low soil ratings (below 86); and
3) Southern Illinois grain farms.6 These classes distinguish among farms that differ in soil productivity
and potential yield variability, with Southern Illinois farms having the lowest soil quality and highest yield
variability (Barry, Escalante, and Bard).  Moreover, the Southern Illinois region is characterized by the
1/3 - 2/3 share lease, while the 50-50 share lease predominates in North and Central Illinois. 8
The unadjusted rental spreads average $3.39, $2.25, and -$2.63 per acre for the highest to
lowest soil quality classes, respectively.7 The average adjusted rental spreads, reflecting the non-sharing
of drying, storage, and crop insurance costs, are reduced to -$9.55, -$8.71, and -$8.65 per acre,
respectively.  As indicated by the coefficients of variation, the rental spreads vary substantially from
year-to-year, reflecting large swings in farm income that would affect the values of share rent.  The
years from 1995-1997 were considered strong net farm income years in Illinois, while 1998 was a
comparatively low income year (FBFM).  Accordingly, the annual average unadjusted share lease
premiums for North and Central, high soil quality farms were $8.64, $32.00, $8.90, and -$35.98 for
the 1995 to 1998 years, respectively.
Regression Analysis
The regression analysis is intended to explore the influence of several key variables on the rental
spreads for those FBFM farms that engage concurrently in both cash and share leasing.  Most of these
variables arise directly from those in equation 8) while others related specifically to key risk factors and
control practices that have been suggested as important to farmers.  The general form of the regression
model is
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where RSi is the rental spread, X1-X4 are variables arising directly from the conceptual model, X5-X6
are financial variables, and X7-X9 are risk control practices.  Specifically, X1 is income variability, X2 is
the farmer’s age (a risk aversion proxy), X3 is cash rent per acre, and X4 is the cash-share acres ratio9
(a proxy for agency costs).  Variables X5 and X6 represent net worth and the debt-to-asset ratio,
respectively.  Risk control practices included in the model are soil rating (X7), machinery investment per
acre (X8), and insurance expense per acre (X9).  Mean values calculated over the four year sample
period are used for the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, except for the income risk
variable.  Plausible, anticipated relationships between the rental spreads and the respective variables are
considered in the next section.
Model Relationships
Greater income variability, measured by the coefficient of variation of the farmer’s net income
over the 1995-1998 period, could be associated with a larger rental spread reflecting the risk-reducing
attribute of share leases.  The farmer’s age could serve as a proxy for the level of risk aversion, where
older ages are associated with lower spreads.  
Table 3 suggests the inclusion of the level of cash rent as an explanatory variable in the model. 
Mean values of the independent variables for spread classes ranging from -$50.00 per acre to above
$50.00 per acre are reported.  One feature is the inverse relationship between the rental spreads and
the mean cash rents.  Apparently, a willingness to pay a high cash rent is a dominant factor affecting the
rental spreads.  The level of cash rent, thus, is included as one of the independent variables.
While no direct measures of agency costs are available, the cash-share acres ratio could reflect
the relative agency costs of the two lease types (e.g., lower agency costs on cash leases are associated
with a higher cash-share ratio and a lower rental spread).  Alternatively, greater reliance on cash
relative to share leases could increase the rental spread, reflecting the greater risk exposure of cash
leasing for the farmer.  10
Several authors have investigated the role of net worth and the debt-to-asset ratio on the choice
among cash and share leases (Sotomayor, Ellinger, and Barry; Bierlen, Parsch and Dixon), although
their effects on rental spreads remains an empirically unanswered question.  Greater net worth could
have an ambiguous relationship to the rental spread.  On the one hand, greater net worth could indicate
a greater financial capacity to pay a higher rental spread.  Alternatively, greater net worth could reflect
an expanded risk carrying capacity, thus supporting a lower spread.  Higher debt-to-asset ratios could
also have ambiguous relationships.  On the one hand, the accompanying increases in financial risk
would help to explain larger spreads, thus reflecting the risk reduction in the sharing arrangement. 
Alternatively, greater leverage may support a farmer’s quest for business growth and a tendency to
make higher bids on cash leases to control additional acreage. 
Soil productivity may also have an ambiguous relationship with the rental spread.  More
productive soils provide greater income sharing potential, especially in North and Central Illinois where
share leasing has been more extensive than cash leasing (Lattz, Cagley, and Raab).  Alternatively, more
productive soils may be viewed as risk reducing, thus allowing lower rental spreads (Barry, Escalante,
and Bard).
Finally, investments in greater machinery capacity by farmers could indicate a greater response
capacity to production risks, and thus a linkage to lower rental spreads.  Alternatively, this investment
could provide an incentive to bid a higher cash rent in order to spread fixed machinery costs over a
larger acreage.  The risk-reducing effects of crop insurance and other forms of insurance could reduce
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The estimation process uses a binomial logistic model involving a discrete dichotomous
dependent variable and continuous explanatory variables (Greene).  Evaluations of discrete choice
typically consider a version of the following generalized model:
where yi is the discrete choice indicator and beta is a vector of coefficients for the matrix of xi
parameters representing characteristics hypothesized to influence choice.
Logistic regression applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent
variable into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent variable occurring or not).  In
this way, the probability of a certain event occurring (i.e., positive rental spreads) is determined by
calculating changes in the log odds of the dependent variable.  
The specification of the logit equation is expressed as:
which represents the probability of an event occurring.  For a non-event, the probability is 1 minus the
event probability.  In this study the “event” variable takes an ordered value of 1 when a farm
experiences a positive rental spread and a value of 0 if the rental spread is less than or equal to 0.  This
approach avoids the possibility of simultaneity bias associated with using the rental spread itself as the12
dependent variable.  In the latter case, cash rent would be both a component of the dependent variable
and an independent variable.  
The logit coefficients are used to estimate the odds that the dependent variable equals 1.  For
the dichotomous case, a coefficient value of b1 indicates that a unit increase in the independent variable
yields a b1 increase in the log odds of the dependent variable.  
A backward elimination procedure is applied.  By setting the retention confidence level to 20%,
variables with low significance can be eliminated.  The estimation results are discussed in the next
section.  
Regression Results
The regression results reported in Table 4 are organized by all farms, regional and soil quality
categorizations, and for unadjusted versus adjusted rental premiums.  For each category, results are
reported for those variables passing the backward elimination procedure.  Reported data include the
parameter values, standard errors of the estimates, and the log odds ratios.
The regression results reported in Table 4 are largely consistent with the potential relationships
among the mean values suggested in Table 2.8 The most uniform results across all farms and farm
classes are the negative and highly significant relationship of the level of cash rent to the rental spread. 
Rental spreads tend to be negative when cash rents are high.  Net worth is also positively and
significantly related to the rental spread for all farms and the North Central farms.  The positive
relationship suggests a greater financial capacity to pay a higher share value or less willingness to pay a
high cash rent.  Soil productivity is also positively and significantly related to the rental spread in several
of the models.  13
The log odds ratio provides implications for the directional relationships between unit changes in
the values of the explanatory variables and the percent increase in the odds of the event (dependent
variable equals 1) happening.  For example, in the All Farms model based on unadjusted premiums, a
unit increase in soil rating will increase the odds of realizing positive rental spreads by about 13% (log
odds ratio of 1.130), while each additional dollar of cash rent will decrease the odds of obtaining
positive spreads by about 6.8% (log odds ratio of 0.932) with less than a 50/50 chance of occurring
relative to the likelihood of obtaining negative rental spreads.
In general, the regression results indicate that rental spreads tend to be negative (or lower)
when cash rents are high on more productive soils and for farmers with relatively high net worths.  Age,
the cash/share combinations, and machinery investments show low incidences of significance, while
none of the other independent variables yielded significant results. 
Discussion and Implications
These descriptive and regression results indicate that non-risk factors likely are the primary
determinants of the magnitude and sign of the rental spread.  The trends toward higher cash rent levels
on larger farms may indicate that higher cash rent is a bidding strategy to control additional leased
acreage and perhaps to avoid management sharing with multiple landlords (Barry, Sotomayor, and
Moss).  Expansion of farm size may be more important than soil productivity in negotiating higher cash
rents, due to potential size economies and under utilized machinery investments.  Variables associated
with income risk, financial risk (the debt-to-asset ratio), and insurance did not yield consistent significant
results.  14
These conditions suggest that many farmers engaged in cash leasing may be missing an effective
risk-reducing opportunity.  Under a 50-50 crop share lease, for example, the higher soil productivity
farmers in North and Central Illinois can transfer half of their variability of net income (see Equation 3)
to the land owner relative to cash leasing, while increasing their rental expense, on average, by only
2.71%.9 Sizeable reductions in risk may, thus, occur relative to modest reductions in expected returns.  
In contrast, land owners must be willing to accept these return levels on share leases in return
for carrying their shares of the income variability. While landlord data are unavailable for this study,
other surveys of farmers and professional farm managers indicate that avoidance of risk is a major
determinant of land-owner preferences for cash leasing (Barry, Sotomayor, and Moss).  Some land
owners apparently prefer to shift to cash leases than to seek higher share levels.  At the same time,
anecdotal evidence from professional managers, lenders, and farmers suggests that landowners likely
are older, wealthier, and more diversified (especially between farm and non-farm investments), thus
enhancing their risk carrying capacities.  The institutional nature of some land owners (pension funds,
banks, religious organizations, and insurance and trust companies) also suggests larger size, greater
diversity, and expanded risk carrying capacities.  Engaging professional managers to select and monitor
farm operators and to assist with risk management, production decisions, and marketing alternatives
may also help to stabilize the land owner’s returns.  
These results could also reflect the effects of possible inequities in share levels due to rigidities in
the traditional sharing arrangements (1/2-1/2 in North and Central Illinois, and 1/3-2/3 in Southern
Illinois).  The 50-50 crop share lease is an equal, yet not necessarily equitable approach to allocating
returns to farmers and land owners.  It may over compensate land owners with low quality soil and15
under compensate those with high quality soil.  Such inequities could explain the negative average rental
spreads in Southern Illinois.  It is doubtful that land owners in Southern Illinois are risk seeking rather
than risk averse, although the negative average spreads suggest this possibility.
Timing and liquidity issues may also arise in determining the preferences and rental spreads for
share and cash leases.  Under share leases, the land owner is obligated to pay his or her share of
variable costs.  Under cash leases, the farmer must bear all of the operating expenses and often pay
part of the cash rent in advance.  Additionally, the land owner may require a higher cash rent for late or
split payments (e.g., half Spring, half Fall) to compensate for the time value of money.  Rental spreads
may also reflect alternative management sharing arrangements, the personal relationship between the
farmer and land owner, the land owner’s obligation for paying social security taxes on share income but
not cash rent income, election of use value of farm land in estate transfers,  and combinations of cash
and share rent.  However, the FBFM data do not reflect these potential effects.  
Finally, the influences of agency and transactions cost could not be directly addressed in the
context of the available data.  Moreover, the cash/share ratio was not significant for the unadjusted
spread model and its positive significance for the adjusted spread model suggests a risk response rather
than an agency response.  By promoting incentive alignment between the contracting parties, the share
lease could reduce the land owner’s monitoring requirements, that would otherwise be higher under
share leasing, and promote efficient resource use.  Under such conditions, the land owner would benefit
from reduced agency costs by more than the apparently small rental spread, and the farmer may be
burdened by more than the spread he pays would suggest.  Alternatively, the high agency costs of
sharing management under share leasing with multiple landowners as farm size increase could favor cash16
leasing.  These possible relationships warrant further study.17
Footnotes
1. While the assumption of normality is for expositional purposes, numerous studies have
demonstrated the conditions underlying the use of the mean-variance model (e.g. Myer;
Robison and Meyers; Tsiang).
2. See Footnote 2 of Barry et al. (2000) for a derivation.
3. Under share rental arrangements in Illinois, government payments generally are shared between
the operator and the landlord in the same proportion that crops are shared.
4. To illustrate the share rent calculations, consider a farm with 1,000 tillable acres, 700 “operator
acres,” 60 percent of total acres under crop share leases, 20 percent under cash leases,
operator crop returns of $250,000 and operator crop expenses of $80,000.  The ratio of
operator acres to total acres is 0.70 = 700/1000.  Crop returns for the entire farm then are
$357,143 = $250,000/0.70.  The value of the landlord’s share is the difference between the
farm and operator crop returns, or $107,143 = $357,143 - $250,000.  Similarly, crop
expenses for the entire farm are $114,286 = $80,000/0.70, and the landlord’s share of crop
expenses is $34,286 = $114,286 - $80,000.  The net value of the share rent paid to the
landlord is the difference between his/her values of crop returns and expenses, or $72,857 =
$107,143 - $34,286.  The net value of share rent per acre is $72,857 divided by 600 share
leased acres.  The result is a share rent per acre of $121.43 = $72,857/600.
5. The $10 figure is subjectively determined based on discussions with FBFM staff.18
6. Each farm participating in the FBFM System receives a soil productivity rating.  The rating is an
average index representing the inherent productivity of all tillable land on the farm.  Individual
soil types in Illinois are assigned an index, for a base level of management, ranging downward
from 100.  These indices compiled for hundreds of soil types in Illinois, are calculated by
relating estimated crop yields for each soil type to benchmark average yields for nine of the
more productive soils in the state.  Compared to other regions of the U.S., land quality in Illinois
is relatively homogeneous, although significant variations occur within regions of the state.
7. Statistical tests indicate that all means except the unadjusted premium for the South are
significantly different from zero at the 95% level and among the pairings of regional means, only
the pairs of unadjusted premiums between the North Central High and South and between the
North Central Low and South differed significantly.
8. Diagnostic tests performed on the data sets for both estimating equations indicate the absence
of heteroscedasticity problems.
9. From Table 1, dividing the unadjusted share lease premium by the cash rent level (i.e.,
3.39/125.05) yields 0.0271.19
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Table 1. Illustrative Rental Spreads 
1
Risk Aversion Coefficient (ë)
Share Level(s) .0002 .01553 .03087 .04620
s = 1/2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Variability (óy)
10 0.01 0.58 1.16 1.73
20 0.03 2.33 4.63 6.93
30 0.07 5.24 10.42 15.59
40 0.12 9.32 18.52 27.72
s = 1/3
Variability (óy)
10 0.01 0.42 0.86 1.28
20 0.02 1.72 3.43 5.13
30 0.05 3.88 7.71 11.54
40 0.09 6.90 13.71 20.52
1 Calculated from equation 8 assuming agency costs on cash and share leases are equal.23
Table 2.   Descriptive Results for Rental Values, 1995-1998
North & Central Illinois 
High Soil Rating
North & Central Illinois 
Low Soil Rating Southern Illinois
Mean S.D. C.V.  Mean S.D. C.V.  Mean S.D. C.V.
$ per acre
Cash rent 125.05 4.40 0.04 107.33 3.21 0.03 76.41 1.78 0.02
Unadjusted share rent 128.44 27.52 0.21 109.59 18.58 0.17 73.78 19.41 0.26
Adjusted share rent 115.50 25.66 0.22 98.63 19.19 0.19 67.76 19.53 0.29
Unadjusted share lease rental spread 3.39 28.44 8.39 2.25 19.85 8.82 -2.63 18.67 -7.10
Adjusted rental spread -9.55 26.64 -2.79 -8.71 17.56 -2.02 -8.65 18.87 -2.18
S.D.  is standard deviation
C.V. is coefficient of variation24





























Below - $50 10 1,413 77 49 780,892 0.2951 240.28 9.54 1.14 152.09 .095
-$49 to -$25 31 905 76 49 541,437 0.4387 241.57 10.20 2.70 116.09 1.03
-$24 to $0 95 832 77 47 457,289 0.4367 269.31 10.00 2.01 110.43 1.19
$1 to $25 68 864 78 48 592,433 0.3126 325.60 10.31 1.82 98.16 1.42
$26 to $50 44 812 83 49 713,540 0.3689 307.28 11.20 0.60 97.10 1.29
Over $50 7 1,049 89 44 935,601 0.3102 437.70 13.94 -19.57 88.87 0.94
TOTAL FARMS 25525




          Unadjusted Rental Premiums                     Adjusted Rental Premiums          
Parameter Standard Errors Log Odds Parameter Standard Errors Log Odds 
ALL FARMS 72.375*** 69.018***
Intercept -2.8105*** 1.0448 -1.7134 1.2878
Net Worth 0.0000008** 0.0000004 1.000 0.0000013*** 0.0000004 1.000
Age -0.0407** 0.0174 0.960
Soil Rating 0.1222*** 0.0204 1.130 0.1244*** 0.0210 1.132
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.9782 0.7491 0.376
Machinery Inv./Acre 0.00148 0.000984 1.001
Cash-Share Acres Ratio 0.1592** 0.0805 1.173
Cash Rent per Acre -0.0706*** 0.0105 0.932 -0.0749*** 0.0111 0.928
NC-HIGH SOIL RATING 38.893*** 38.389***
Intercept 10.3774*** 2.4404 4.5889 7.5436
Net Worth 0.000001** 0.0000005 1.000 0.0000012** 0.0000006 1.000
Age -0.0566* 0.0342 0.945
Income Risk -0.5511 0.3753 0.576
Soil Rating 0.1058 0.0806 1.112
Machinery Inv./Acre 0.00331* 0.00183 1.003
Cash-Share Acres Ratio 0.1587 0.1201 1.172
Cash Rent per Acre -0.0983*** 0.0209 0.906 -0.1047*** 0.0229 0.901
NC - LOW SOIL RATING 33.833*** 36.282***
Intercept -1.1082 2.2213 -1.8398 2.3011
Net Worth 0.000002*** 0.0000009 1.000 0.000003*** 0.0000009 1.000
Soil Rating 0.1405*** 0.0476 1.151 0.1605*** 0.0504 1.174
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -1.6339 1.0549 0.195 -1.9465* 1.1884 0.143
Cash-Share Acres Ratio 0.3510** 0.1460 0.143
Cash Rent per Acre -0.0969*** 0.0230 0.908 -0.1187*** 0.0265 0.888
SOUTH REGION 7.078*** 8.140***
Intercept 2.1707* 1.2363 -14.7179** 6.7654
Soil Rating 0.2881** 0.1212 1.334
Debt-to-Asset Ratio 5.0506** 2.4269 156.115
Cash Rent per Acre -0.0450*** 0.0178 0.956 -0.0884*** 0.0353 0.915
1Across each model name is a score statistic that will indicate the model’s explanatory power.  Asterisks denote the score statistics’ significance at 90% (*), 95% (**) and 99%
(***) confidence level.
2Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance of the parameter estimates at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels.26
Appendix
Equation 7) is obtained by setting equations 4) and 6) equal to each other and solving for r:
( )( ) 1 2 2
2 2 - - - = - - - - s y a y r oc a s y c y s l s A1)
By canceling similar terms and adding and subtracting terms from both sides, the expression for r is
( ) [ ] r s y oc a a s s s c y = - + - - - l s 2 2
2 ( ) A2)
Similar expressions can be derived for the landowner.  His/her expected net income from the leasing alternatives is
n p r p sy p s oc pa p a s c = - + - - - - ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 A3)
The expected utility from share leasing is
[ ] E U n s y oc a s s
l




and from cash leasing is
[ ] E U n r ac ( ) = - A5)
where ël is the land owner’s level of risk aversion.  Equating A4) and A5), and solving for the rental spread yields27
s y oc r a a s s c
l




The condition under which the farmer and landlord would have the same rental spread would be found by equating equation 8) in the text to







For s = 1/2, equal spreads would occur if the landlord’s risk aversion measure is one third 
(= .5/(2-.5)) that of the farmer’s.  Otherwise, differences in risk attitudes and agency costs between the farmer and land owner would need to
be negotiated in order to reach a rental decision.